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INTERNATIONAL SOLUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL 
INSOLVENCY: AN INSOLUBLE PROBLEM? 
Donna McKenzie* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The problems posed by international insolvencies, that is, insol-
vencies in which the laws of more than one jurisdiction come into . 
play in the course of the insolvency, and the search for an accept-
able international solution to those problems, are not new or even 
recent phenomena. In his address to the Colloquium on Cross-
Border Insolvency· held in Vienna in April 1994 (first Vienna Collo-
quium), Ron Harmer commented on the staggering number of ar-
ticles written on the subject, going back decades, even centuries.3 
However, despite the existence of a limited number of unilateral, 
bi-lateral, or localized multi-lateral measures, a widely acceptable in-
ternational solution remains what has been aptly described as a 
"Holy Grail," desirable but elusive, notwithstanding continuing ef-
forts at many levels to attain it. 
This may not be surprising when one considers that the search 
for solutions to the problems of international insolvency is compli-
cated by a number of factors. First, whereas parties may, if they so 
wish, choose the governing law of their contract, the method of dis-
pute resolution and so on, they cannot choose the law which will 
govern in the event of the insolvency of one or other (or both) of 
them. 
Second, and connected to this point, if insolvency does occur, 
the law which ultimately governs that insolvency may not be predict-
able. The parties will have considered what arrangements they wish 
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to make to protect themselves in the event of insolvency, for exam- . 
pIe the taking of security. They will test the validity and effectiveness 
of those measures against the laws which they think are likely to ap-
ply in the event of supervening insolvency. But it may happen that 
an entirely different law will apply. For example, the insolvent party 
may have a creditor residing in a jurisdiction otherwise completely 
unconnected with the parties, but which allows that creditor to 
open insolvency proceedings in that jurisdiction. The applicable law 
in that jurisdiction may not recognize the measures taken or may 
ascribe to them a different effect to that which the parties had in-
tended. Even if the parties wished to do so, it would be virtually im-
possible to establish every possible connection with other jurisdic-
tions and assess whether their insolvency laws might conceivably 
apply if the worst came to pass.4 
Third, although insolvency law is often ·treated as a discrete 
area of law, the rules on insolvency in most jurisdictions are in fact 
inextricably interwoven with the rules in many other areas of law, 
particularly property law, but also status, employment, remedies, 
and so on. Any major changes to insolvency law, including the rules 
on the treatment of insolvencies with an international element, may 
have repercussions for other such areas of the law, which mayor 
may not be regarded as acceptable and at the very least would ne-
cessitate review of those other areas also. 
This article will, therefore, briefly review the existing measures 
adopted to address the problems of cross-border insolvency and ex-
amine the current initiatives to promote other such measures, and 
assess whether a widely acceptable solution to the problems of inter-
national insolvencies is ever likely to become a reality. 
II: LEVELS OF ACTION 
Before embarking on the examination of the existing and pro-
posed measures to deal with the problems of international insol-
vency, it is important to be clear about the different levels at which 
action can be taken to improve cooperation in international insol-
vencies. This is so for two reasons. First, the very fact that action 
can be taken at different levels is important in itself - action at 
one level may be more attractive to any given jurisdiction than ac-
tion at another. Second, the level at which action is taken may have 
4. And even if this could be done, it is doubtful if the parties would be able to 
take measures which would simultaneously protect them in all such jurisdic-
tions. 
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a bearing on the likely success of the measure, and also has implica-
tions for whether that measure is likely to prove to be widely 
acceptable. 
At the first Vienna Colloquium, Bruce Leonards suggested four 
such levels: 
(i) multi-lateral treaties 
(ii) bi-Iateral treaties 
(iii) facilitative provisions in domestic legislation 
(iv) use of protocols at an individual level 
Although one might suggest refinements to that list, on the whole it 
does give a good perspective of the differing levels at which action 
can be taken. 
It is significant that harmonization of the insolvency laws of na-
tions is not featured on this list. Harmonization of insolvency laws, 
effectively the ideal solution to the problems of cross-border insol-
vency and the guiding light of some earlier efforts in this field, has 
now been accepted by many as an unrealistic goal for the foresee-
able future. It has largely been abandoned in favor of an "art of the 
possible" approach seeking to achieve· solutions which, although 
perhaps more modest, are also more attainable in a shorter period 
of time. At the first Vienna Colloquium, Ron Harmer described it 
as an impossible ideal, "nice to write about, nice to contemplate,;' 
but one which could not be achieved. In his view, future efforts re-
quired to concentrate on achieving things of a very basic nature, 
even if these were more limited. His perception was that aiming too 
high, as he put it, would only result in ten more years without any 
progress at all. 
This is, of course, a very pragmatic approach. Indeed, it might 
be said to echo the equally pragmatic attitude often adopted by 
creditors in individual insolvency situations: half a loaf is better than 
no bread, particularly if it is half a loaf right now, or at least sooner 
rather than later. However, in my view, the concept of harmoniza-
tion cannot be written off as irrelevant to continuing efforts if a 
widely acceptable international solution is the ultimate goal. The 
terms of the UNCITRAL resolution, which gave rise to the first Vi-
enna Colloquium and, following on from it, the joint project with 
INSOL, were to investigate "the desirability and feasibility of harm~ 
nized rules of cross-border insolvencies" and to consider "what as-
pects of cross-border insolvency lend themselves to· harmonization" 
5. Panner in the Toronto law finn of Cassells, Brock & Blackwell; co-chainnan of 
the International Bar Association's Committee J. 
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as well as what might be "the most suitable vehicle for harmoniza-
tion." Many of the participants in the Colloquium appeared to con-
clude that harmonization was not feasible, but the concept cannot 
be completely ignored. This is discussed further below. 
III. EXISTING CROSS-BORDER PROVISIONS IN OPERATION 
A. Treaties (Levels 1 and 2) 
At levels 1 and 2 of the scale, there are relatively few multi-
lateral and bi-Iateral treaties in operation. 
The only multi-lateral treaties currently operational are the 
Nordic Convention of 1933 between Sweden, Denmark, Norway and 
Finland; the Montevideo treaties of 1889 and 1940 between Argen-
tina and Peru, Colombia, Bolivia, Uruguay and Paraguay; and the 
Havana Convention of 1928. 
Two other multi-lateral treaties have been drawn up, namely 
the Council of Europe Convention on Certain Aspects of Interna-
tional Insolvency (Council of Europe Convention) and the Eur~ 
pean Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings (E.U. Conven-
tion), but neither of these is yet in operation. The Council of 
Europe Convention has been open for signature since June 5, 1990, 
but few member countries have signed it, and none have ratified it. 
A minimum of three ratifications would be necessary to bring it 
into force between ratifying states. Most of the members of the Eu-
ropean Union have not signed it, perhaps on the basis that their 
own Convention, that is the E.U. Convention, which provides for 
the Council of Europe Convention to be superseded as between Eu-
ropean Union member states, would soon be concluded. The E.U. 
Convention has not yet, 'however, come into force either. It was 
opened for signature on November 23, 1995 and stipulated that it 
remained open for signature until May 23, 1996. It was signed 
within that time period by all the member states except the United 
Kingdom (U.K..), who refused to sign it as part of its policy of non-
cooperation resulting from the B.S.E. crisis. Since the legal basis for 
the Convention is Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome, all member 
states must sign it before it can come into force. The U.K..'s failure 
to sign it before the stipulated date therefore effectively means that 
the Convention cannot progress any further. It is unlikely, however, 
that the Convention will be abandoned altogether and it is antici-
pated that it will be revived in due course. 
There is a greater, though still relatively small, number of bi-
lateral treaties, most of them between countries which are now 
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members of the European Union. Existing bi-Iateral treaties be-
tween members of the European Union will be superseded by the 
E.U. Convention when, if ever, the latter comes into force. Simi-
larly, the Nordic Convention will also be partially superseded by the 
E.U. Convention: cross-border insolvency matters between those 
states which are party to the Nordic Convention and also members 
of the European Union will be regulated by the E.U. Convention in 
preference to the Nordic Convention insofar as they fall within the 
scope of the E.U. Convention. 
B. Domestic Law Pruvisions (Level 3) 
At level 3 of the scale described above, a number of countries 
now have domestic legislation regulating recognition and assistance 
in cross-border insolvencies. Longest standing of these is the United 
States with Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, which came into 
force in 1978. Section 304 allows foreign insolvency office-holders to 
apply for the commencement of an ancillary case in the United 
States providing certain conditions are fulfilled, and thereby obtain 
various forms of assistance from the United States court. Despite 
the volume of literature on this provision, there are few reported 
cases. However, practitioners seem to be of view that this does not 
mean the provision is not used or useful. Indeed, quite the 
contrary. 
In 1986, the V.K. introduced legislation in the form of Section 
426 of the Insolvency Act of 1986. This provides for mandatory assis-
tance between the insolvency courts of the separate jurisdictions of 
the V.K. and certain other prescribed countries, mostly former 
Commonwealth countries.6 Although section 426 requires that a re-
quest for assistance comes through the court of the territory where 
the insolvency proceedings are taking place, rather than allowing di-
rect access to the court by the office-holder, the section has been 
used with success. For example, in Dallhold Estates (U.K.) Pty. Ltd.,1 
an administration order under the Insolvency Act of 1986 was made 
in the V.K. in relation to an Australian company already in liquida-
tion in Queensland, thereby allowing the preservation of assets 
6. Section 426(4) of the Insolvency Act of 1986 itself mandates assistance be-
tween the courts of the UK and those of the Channel Islands and the Isle of 
Man. :The other countries to which § 426 applies are Anguilla, Australia, the 
Bahamas, Bermuda, Botswana, Canada, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Gi-
braltar, Guernsey, Hong Kong, Republic of Ireland, Montserrat, New Zealand, 
St. Helena, Turks and Caicos Islands, Tuvalu and Vugin Islands. 
7. [1992] BCC 394. 
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which would otherwise have been lost. However, although the word-
ing of the section is mandatory, in the case of In R.e Focus Ins. Co.,s 
the English court refused an application for assistance on behalf of 
the liquidator of a Bermudan company under the section on the 
basis that the relief sought was in relation to a person subject to a 
bankruptcy order in England and was inconsistent with the scheme 
imposed by the English insolvency legislation for the recovery of as-
sets of a bankrupt. The court took the view that it was entitled to 
do so notwithstanding the mandatory wording of the statute if there 
were sufficiently strong reasons for doing so. Regrettably, this deci-
sion undermines the section. 
In Australia, the domestic provisions are not dissimilar to those 
of the U.K. in that they provide for mandatory assistance in relation 
to certain designated countries with such assistance being sought 
through the medium of a request from the foreign court. They go 
further than the V.K. legislation, however, in providing for discre-
tionary assistance in relation to any other country, without specify-
ing any preconditions for such assistance or indeed any guidelines 
as to when it should or should not be given. Of course, although 
there is no statutory provision in the V.K. regarding assistance in 
relation to countries which do not fall under section 426, there are 
common law rules of private international law which allow discre-
tionary assistance to foreign insolvency office-holders. Arguably, 
however, it would be better if these were also put on a statutory 
footing. 
It is probably not coincidence that those countries which have 
led the way in introducing domestic legislation in this field are 
those which have separate systems of law operating within their own 
borders. Such countries will have experienced cross-border insol-
vency problems arising "internally" as well as in truly international 
situations and recognized the need for effective rules to regulate 
such matters. But of course the rising incidence of truly interna-
tional insolvency means that more and more countries now come 
across the problems of cross-border insolvency, and hence the de-
mands for suitable solutions. 
C. Protocols in Individual Cases (Level 4) 
Such protocols, which have been described as "mini-treaties,"9 
have been used in a number of cases to regulate the conduct of 
8. The Times, May 6, 1996. 
9. Judge Tina Brozman in her address to the first Vienna Colloquium. 
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particular insolvencies. The most famous example of the use of 
such a protocol is probably the Maxwell case, where Chapter 11 pro-
ceedings in the United States (U.S.) and administration proceed-
ings in the U.K were coordinated by means of a protocol drawn up 
by the examiner appointed by the U.S. court and approved by both 
the U.S. and the U.K courts. Another example of the successful use 
of such a protocol is the case of Everfresh Beverages Inc., which in-
volved coordination of proceedings in the U.S. and Canada. 
IV. CURRENT INITIATIVES 
A. The International Bar Associations (LB.A.) Cross-Border Insolvency 
Concordat (Level 4) 
Operating at level 4 of the scale described above, the I.B.A. 's 
Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat provides a statement of princi-
ples to be followed in drawing up protocols for use in individual 
cases. Although not officially published at the time of writing, the 
principles contained in the Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat were 
used in drawing up the protocol in the Everfresh Beverages case. 
B. The International Bar Association s Model International Insolvency 
Cooperation Act 
The I.B.A. 's Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act 
(MllCA) provides model legislation which can be adopted by coun-
tries into their own domestic legislation, thereby allowing them to 
operate at level 3 on the above scale. The provisions of the model 
legislation provide for recognition of the foreign representative in 
insolvency proceedings and mandatory assistance to the foreign pro-
ceedings if either the foreign jurisdiction has substantially similar 
legislation or the foreign forum is a proper and convenient one 
and it is in the overall interest of the creditors to administer the es-
tate there. They provide further that the foreign representative may 
commence ancillary proceedings for the purposes of obtaining pre-
scribed reliefs or, if such ancillary proceedings are unavailable or 
denied, a full insolvency proceeding in accordance with the provi-
sions of the local law. In the former case, foreign substantive law 
will normally apply; in the latter case, local law will apply. They also 
provide for supercession of the provisions where any treaty is appli-
cable. The model legislation has not, however, been adopted by any 
country as yet, perhaps because it relies on or contains concepts 
which may be unacceptable to some countries. 
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C. INSOL/UNCITRAL Project on Cross-Border Insolvency 
The first Vienna Colloquium was followed by further sessions in 
Toronto in 1995 and Vienna in 1996, and sessions in New York and 
New Orleans have taken place this year. A model law is now at an 
advanced stage. The model law will now be submitted to the UNCI-
TRAL full Commission meeting scheduled to take place in May of 
this year for approval and adoption. Assuming such adoption, the 
model law would be put forward for confirmation of the meeting of 
the General Assembly of the United Nations scheduled to take 
place in July of this year. 
Like MllCA before it, the model law will provide modellegisla-
tion which can be adopted into each country's domestic law, thus 
allowing them to operate at level 3 of the scale. It is longer and 
more detailed than MllCA, but nonetheless essentially restricts itself 
to dealing with the issues surrounding the recognition of foreign 
proceedings, access to the courts of the country in which recogni-
tion is sought, either through the foreign court or directly by the 
foreign representative, and the kinds of relief necessary to protect 
businesses and assets. However, some provisions are more far-
reaching. For example, a distinction is drawn between foreign 
"main" proceedings and others, with certain consequences follow-
ing on the recognition of such "main" proceedings. This and some 
other provisions have been adopted from the E. U. Convention. An 
important provision is that which allows and encourages direct co-
opera,tion between courts and provides a non-exhaustive list of 
means by which this might be achieved, a major facilitating provi-
sion where courts do not currently have inherent power to achieve 
this. 
D. The Council of Europe Convention 
As its name suggests, this Convention attempts to deal only with 
some aspects of international insolvency. It applies only to proceed-
ings involving disinvestment of the debtor. Initially intended only to 
make provision for the exercise of certain powers of office holders 
outside their own jurisdiction, ultimately its scope was expanded to 
cover three areas: exercise of the liquidator'S powers outside his 
home jurisdiction, the opening of secondary proceedings in other 
jurisdictions, and matters relating to creditors' claims. It allows for a 
plurality of proceedings in different jurisdictions, but provides for 
only one of these to have universal effect, the others being limited 
in effect. Signatories may choose to disapply the provisions relating 
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to the exercise of the liquidator's powers outside his own jurisdic-
tion and the provisions relating to the opening of secondary pro-
ceedings. However, as stated, the Convention has not yet come into 
force and may indeed never do so. 
E. The E. U. Convention 
The E.U. Convention is also restricted in scope to proceedings 
which entail the partial or total divestment of the debtor and the 
appointment of a liquidator, although the proceedings which are 
specified in Annex A to the E. U. Convention as meeting that defini-
tion for the U.K include the rescue-oriented procedures of adminis-
tration and voluntary arrangements. However, some of the impor-
tant provisions of the E.U. Convention are restricted to winding up 
proceedings, which exclude these rescue-oriented procedures. Like 
the Council of Europe Convention, which was used as a working 
draft for the E. U. Convention, it also allows for a plurality of pro-
ceedings. It is a direct convention imposing mandatory rules of ju-
risdiction which override national rules, and it is according to the 
jurisdictional basis on which proceedings are opened that the E. U. 
Convention determines their effect. All proceedings opened in ac-
cordance with the grounds of jurisdiction specified in the E. U. Con-
vention are accorded automatic recognition throughout the Union, 
but proceedings opened in the debtor's "centre of main interests" 
are given universal effect throughout the Union, the liquidator be-
ing able to exercise his powers in any other member state with few 
restrictions, while any other proceedings opened on the alternative 
basis of the presence of an "establishment" of the debtor have only 
territorial effect. The E.U. Convention provides a number of choice-
of-law rules by which questions arising in the insolvency will be de-
termined, some of which are qualified or may be disapplied in cer-
tain circumstances. The E.U. Convention does not, however, at-
tempt to deal with the difficulties caused by the situation where 
there are some proceedings within the Union and some outwith it, 
a situation which is potentially fraught with disaster. 
F. International Bar Association:S Model Insolvency Code 
This project aims to develop a set of model provisions relating 
to each of the major concepts of insolvency law, for example, 
grounds of challenge of prior transactions, priority claims, tests for 
insolvency and, importantly, recognition of foreign proceedings and 
assistance to foreign insolvency office-holders, which could be con-
sidered by countries reforming (or indeed forming) their insolvency 
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laws and adopted by them into their new domestic law. Its goal is to 
promote harmonization of insolvency laws worldwide and, thereby, 
facilitate the proper and fair treatment of creditors' daims in inter-
national insolvencies. In other words, it will work at the higher level 
of harmonizing the insolvency regimes of countries rather than at 
any of the levels on the scale discussed above. 
G. Other Initiatives 
There are a number of other initiatives currently being consid-
ered by various bodies in the United States, particularly. For exam-
ple, the American Bankruptcy Institute (A.B.I.) has recently ap-
proved proposals for amendments to U.S. domestic law which would 
alleviate the problems currently encountered by foreign insolvency 
office-holders having to apply for relief in different states wherever 
action is required in more than one state. The amendments would 
clarify that the various bases for venue in section 1410 may be re-
garded as alternatives, provide a catch-all venue choice related to 
convenience and the interests of justice for foreign proceedings, 
and allow consolidation of all proceedings filed by a foreign repre-
sentative seeking the assistance of the U.S. courts. This is a useful 
initiative for improvement of existing domestic provisions. The 
American Law Institute has embarked on a project to explore the 
possibility of harmonization of the insolvency laws of the NAFTA 
states, but this remains at a relatively early stage of study and, there-
fore, concrete results may be some time away. 
v. THE ELUSIVENESS OF A UNIVERSAL SOLUTION 
Why, then, have none of the existing provisions proved to be a 
universal, or at least widely acceptable, solution? Will any of the cur-
rent initiatives prove to be so? If not, why not? 
It is trite to say that the legal systems of the world are different, 
sometimes dramatically different, from each other. Nonetheless that 
is both the root of the problem in international insolvencies and 
the main reason why it is so difficult to find a universally acceptable 
solution to international insolvency problems. This, too, is the rea-
son why harmonization of insolvency laws is the ideal answer to the 
problems of international insolvency, even if, realistically, it seems 
an unattainable dream. 
The question, therefore, remains whether action at any of the 
other levels discussed can realistically provide a widely acceptable 
solution. 
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At the level of treaties, the answer is probably no. We have seen 
that there are some multi-lateral treaties which appear to work well, 
but they are what might be described as purely regional. That is, in-
deed, the essence of their success. They work well in their own par-
ticular context because the countries involved have close links and 
similar legal systems and insolvency laws. They would not necessarily 
work outside their own particular context. At the first Vienna Coll~ 
quium, Professor Michael Bogdan10 said of the Nordic Convention 
that 
[it] functions very well. However, I would not recommend it for 
universal use. One has to keep in mind that the Nordic 
countries are very close, although not perhaps as close as 
the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada. Danes, 
Norwegians and Swedes understand each other, they are ge-
ographically close, their legal systems are similar and they 
have a high level of confidence in each other's legal sys-
tems. Under such conditions, the Convention works well 
and is generally accepted. A Swedish creditor may in an-
other country get less, or more, than he would receive in a 
Swedish bankruptcy, but that is accepted. 
Even on a regional basis, if one contemplates a wider region 
than that which has worked successfully in the case of the Nordic 
Convention, it may not be possible to successfully conclude a worth-
while treaty. Even if there are close trade and other links between 
nations, the greater the number of countries involved, the more dif-
ferences in their legal systems and laws there are likely to be. The 
more difficult, therefore, will be the process of reaching a solution 
which is acceptable to all. This has been amply illustrated in the dif-
ficulties which were encountered in concluding the Council of Eu-
rope Convention and, particularly, the E.U. Convention. Even 
within the European Union, where the advent of the single market 
and increasing cross-border trade within the Union made the find-
ing of solutions to the cross-border insolvency problems which 
would inevitably result imperative, it took more than ten years, and 
that at the second attempt, to reach an acceptable compromise. 
Even nearing completion, the success of the project remained 
doubtful, because of differences between member states, not just on 
minor issues, but on the absolutely fundamental question of univer-
sality versus territoriality. That being so, however, the fact that the 
10. Professor of Law at the University of Lund. 
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treaty was concluded shows that agreements may be reached even in 
the face of very great differences. But it is suggested that the E. U. 
Convention is operating at the limits of what is possible for this me-
dium, and where no imperative, such as those that existed in the 
case of the European Union, exists, agreements involving large 
numbers of countries are unlikely. And the E.U. Convention is still 
only a regional Convention, albeit encompassing a slightly wider re-
gion than previous treaties, and is likely to be no more "exporta-
ble" to other regions than previous treaties have been. It is unlikely, 
for instance, that the E.U. Convention would be acceptable to the 
U.S. As already discussed, the Convention is not particularly ori-
ented towards rescue/reorganization procedures, and indeed has 
been strongly criticized on that ground.ll At the same time, it has 
been observed that the U.S. would be very reluctant to submit to 
any concordat or series of treaties where reorganization procedures, 
and in particular the concept of "debtor in possession," are not ac-
corded full recognition.12 The concept of "debtor in possession," 
and the reluctance in many countries to recognize proceedings 
where the debtor is in possession, would appear to be another fun-
damental issue which may become a serious obstacle to reaching 
agreement on a wider basis. 
Bi-Iateral treaties may be easier to achieve, but the problems 
are the same. They only allow cooperation between the two signato-
ries and they may not be "exportable" to other contexts. 
Further, in the case of both multi-lateral and bi-Iateral treaties, 
there is the additional difficulty of providing adequately for the situ-
ation where there are insolvency proceedings in both a treaty coun-
try and a non-treaty country. When an international insolvency situ-
ation arises, it will often be the case that even if some of the 
countries involved have treaty arrangements, there will be other ju-
risdictions involved which do not have such arrangements with any 
or all of the other relevant jurisdictions. The situation where some 
of the proceedings fall within the scope of a treaty and some do not 
11. See, e.g., Johnson, The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: A Cri-
tique of the Convention s Cmporate &scue Paradigm, 5 INT'L INSOLVENCY REv. 80 
(1996). 
12. This view was expressed by Louis Levit, a U.S. member of INSOL, at the first 
Vienna Colloquium, and more recently echoed by Harold Burman at the Sym-
posium on Developments in International Commercial Law held at the Uni-
versity of Baltimore on March 26-28, 1991, where he suggested that the E.U. 
Convention would be unacceptable in its current form because of its concen-
tration on liquidation type procedures. 
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is fraught with difficulty. This is a problem which the E.U. Conven-
tion certainly fails to address, and such failure may cause complica-
tions to rival those which may c~ently exist in the absence of any 
agreement at all. 
At the level of domestic law, although so few countries have 
promulgated legislation specifically in relation to cross-border insol-
vencies, there may be routes of access for an insolvency office-
holder into a foreign system other than, or regardless of the exis-
tence of, specific provisions anent cross-border insolvency. In the 
United States, for example, there are provisions other than section 
304 on which a foreign insolvency office-holder may rely. Indeed, 
these may be preferable to invoking section 304 in certain circum-
stances.For example, if all that is sought is discovery, this may be 
obtained under section 1782 of the United States Code. Or the of-
fice-holder may prefer to commence a full bankruptcy. In the U.K, 
commencement of full or ancillary insolvency proceedings may also 
be an option available to a foreign office-holder. Assistance may be 
available at common law even where section 426 does not apply. 
The same would be true in many other countries. It is acknowl-
edged, however, that the recognized difficulty in relying on such 
general provisions for access into a foreign system is that they may 
not be particularly suitable for obtaining the kinds of assistance that 
are likely to be required in cross-border insolvency cases, and in 
civil law jurisdictions, there may be little or no inherent jurisdiction 
in the court to manufacture suitable assistance. 
Even where domestic law specifically relating to cross-border in-
solvency has been enacted, however, it never gives unconditional 
recognition and unrestricted access to the foreign system. The U.K 
and Australia have adopted the system of mandatory assistance to 
prescribed countries and discretionary assistance to others. I3 The 
countries which have been prescribed as suitable to receive 
mandatory assistance have been selected because they have similar 
legal systems and laws so that the country granting assistance can 
have confidence in the proceedings to which it is granting assis-
tance. As discussed above, however, in the U.K at least even the 
13. As indicated above, in the case of Australia, both mandatory and discretionary 
assistance are specifically provided for by statute, whereas in the U.K, only the 
mandatory assistance is statutory, but discretionary assistance is still available 
under the existing common law rules of private international law. 
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"mandatory" requirement is not truly mandatory: an overriding dis-
cretion remains. In the case of section 304, assistance is wholly dis-
cretionary. The court is directed to take into account prescribed fac-
tors including whether the distribution of proceeds is substantially 
in accordance with U.S. law. The issue is therefore the same as in 
the case of treaties: countries are generally prepared to give access 
and recognition to proceedings which come from a system similar 
to theirs, but not necessarily to others. Therefore, even if all coun-
tries were to adopt domestic legislation, it is unlikely that this would 
guarantee universal uniform treatment of insolvencies. Each country 
would still undoubtedly wish to give itself the option of refusing as-
sistance in cases where, for whatever reasons it deemed valid, it con-
sidered the consequences of doing so to be unacceptable. The ex-
pressed aim of MIICA was that every country in the world would 
adopt it. Even had that aim been achieved, universal uniformity 
would not. For even MIICA is not completely mandatory in all re-
spects. Nor is the prospective UNCITRAL model law. Further, it is 
unlikely that countries would be prepared to adopt them in that 
form if they were. 
At the level of individual cases, the successful conclusion of 
protocols in particular cases will depend on whether the results of 
doing so are acceptable to the court required to approve it. A court 
is unlikely to be willing to approve a protocol in cases where the 
other proceedings emanate from a system which will have radically 
different outcomes to that envisaged in the other jurisdictions. It 
might be pointed out with justification that the fact that the u.s. 
proceedings in Maxwell were debtor in possession proceedings 
under Chapter 11, an issue earlier identified as one likely to cause 
difficulties, did not prevent the conclusion of a protocol in that 
case. However, the U.S. judge in that case commented that al-
though the proceedings seemed to be very different, there were not 
in fact fundamental differences between the two systems. Again, 
therefore, the fundamental similarity of the systems involved is the 
key. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
What, then, may be concluded from this analysis? One must 
s~rely conclude that, standing continuing fundamental differences 
between the legal systems and laws of countries, countries will only 
be prepared to apply measures designed to facilitate cooperation in 
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international insolvencies at any level to other countries whose sys-
tems are basically similar to their own. Anything short of harmoniza-
tion is, therefore, unlikely to produce a solution which is universally 
acceptable or even acceptable to a majority of countries. 
The goal of harmonization must therefore continue to be pur-
sued if a perfect solution is sought. This does not mean, however, 
that current or future initiatives at any level other than harmoniza-
tion should not be pursued. If international commerce, as seems 
likely, continues to expand rather than contract, the sheer number 
of cases in which international insolvency problems will arise may in 
itself provide an imperative to make countries act. If the lack of a 
solution to such problems has a restricting effect on international 
trade, and this would appear to be the case, this will provide the 
necessary incentive for action. But if that action is of different kinds 
and at different levels in different countries, this need not be re-
garded as failure, even if it means, as it inevitably will, that there 
will still be cases where parties and insolvency office-holders achieve 
a less than perfect result. It would only be failure if the aim re-
mains to promulgate a universal solution, and to continue to define 
success in this field in terms· of the universality of the solution may 
be to miss the point. Parties wishing to protect their position in the 
event of insolvency, as the ultimate creditors in any such insolvency, 
are primarily concerned with being able to predict what will happen 
on insolvency, so that they may take the most appropriate measures 
to safeguard their position. In general, any action taken by coun-
tries at any level will facilitate this process and thereby make life 
easier, if still imperfect, for such parties and also for any insolvency 
office-holder subsequently appointed. It may therefore be that the 
better approach for the future is to accept that, short of harmoniza-
tion, a universal or widely acceptable solution will not be found, 
and to concentrate on achieving as much as possible through cur-
rent and future initiatives without measuring them against the yard-
stick of universality of application. 

